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create a new tort along the lines of due care to fit radio defamation appears
to be the most logical and uniform method of handling the problem.
Indiana's statute regarding radio defamation does not define the liability
of the broadcaster.1 7 The implication is thatif is absolute liability as in libel
since it provides for mitigation of damages by retraction, the same as the
statute applicable to newspapers.1 8
The few available decisions may be harmonized by adopting the defense
of due care. From such a view the present state of the law would appear to
be that if the defamation is in a prepared script, available to the broadcaster,
he is liable in the absence of privilege because failure to prevent publication
is a lack of due care. If the defamation is extemporaneous, the broadcaster is
liable for slander upon showing lack of due care. If the speaker is the agent
of the broadcaster, of course respondeat superior will apply. R. B. W.
TAXATION-MULTIPLE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLE PRoPERTy.-Decedent, domi-
ciled in Tennessee, transferred securities in trust to an Alabama trustee,
reserving the power to remove the trustee and to dispose of the trust estate
by her will. Decedent bequeathed the trust property to the trustee in trust
but in different amounts and by different estates from those provided for
by the trust indenture. Both Tennessee and Alabama asserted the right to
impose an inheritance tax on the trust property passing under decedent's
will. Plaintiffs allege that both states cannot constitutionally place a tax
on the property. Held, both states may impose an inheritance tax on the trust
property. Curry v. McCanless (1939), 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900. Decedent
'transferred bonds to a Colorado trustee to hold for specified trust purposes
reserving the power to change any beneficiary and to revoke the trust and
reinvest title in herself. After creating the trust, decedent became a domiciled
resident of New York where she died without appointing new beneficiaries
of the trust or revoking it. Both states assessed a tax on the transfer at
death of the trust fund. Held, not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
for New York to place an inheritance tax on the trust property after Colorado
has already done so. Graves u. Elliott (1939), 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913.
Early in this century the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of due
process for Kentucky to place a tax on an incorporeal hereditament (franchise)
derived from Indiana and owned by a Kentucky corporation because the
franchise had a situs in Indiana and had already been taxed by Indiana.1
Next it was held that coal, property of a Pennsylvania corporation, but stored
in other states, could not be used in enhancing the value of the capital stock
of the corporation for purposes of taxation.2 These two decisions were a
foundation for the rule that tangible property is subject to taxation only in
the state where permanently located and not by the state of the owner's
domicile.3 The court was careful to point out that it was making no rule
17 Acts 1937, c. 37, § 1, p. 231, Burns '33, § 2-517 (Supp. 38).
18 Acts 1895, c. 45, Sec. 1, Burns '33, § 2-104-3.
ILouisville and Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky (1903), 188 U. S.
385, 23 S. Ct. 463.
2 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania (1905),
198 U. S. 34-1, 25 S. Ct. 669.
, 3 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 26
S. Ct. 36.
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in regard to intangibles. 4 Not until 20 years later was the principle extended
to inheritance taxation so that taxation by decedent's state of domicile of
tangible personal property permanently located without the state was held
not to be due process of law.5 Tangible property has thus for some time
enjoyed a consistent rule in regard to taxation. The domicile of the owner
can levy a property tax even though the property is not physically present in
the state,0 unless it has acquired a situs elsewhere,7 and in that event, that
state alone may tax.8 Further, the basis of inheritance taxation of tangible
personalty was held to be on the same principle as for property taxation:
the jurisdiction of the property, 9 although the formal subject matter is dif-
ferent.1 0 Multiple taxation of intangibles did not stop however, with the
invalidation of multiple taxation of tangible property. When considering
intangibles the court often stated, "the Fourteenth Amendment does not pro-
hibit double taxation." 11 The first case that appeared to be a reversal of
4"It is unnecessary to say that this case does not involve the question of
the taxation of intangible property, or of inheritance or succession taxes.
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 211.
5 Frick v. Pennsylvania (1905), 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603.
6 Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky (1911), 222 U. S. 63, 32 S. Ct. 13;
New York v. Miller (1906), 202 U. S. 584, 26 S. Ct 714; Tacoma Oriental
S.S. Co. v. Tallant (1931), 51 F (2nd) 359.
7Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia (1904), 198 U. S. 299, 25 S.
Ct. 686.
8 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 26
S. Ct. 36.
9 Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925), 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603. State. of
decedent's domicile forbidden to assess an inheritance tax measured by extra
state tangible personalty. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932), 284
U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, stated, "It was in the Frick case, however, that the
rule became definitely fixed that, as to tangible personal property, the power
to tax is exclusively in the state where the property has an actual situs."
10 Mager v. Grima (1850), 8 Howard 490, 493, states that the inheritance
tax "is nothing more than an exercise of the power which every state and
sovereignty possesses, of regulating the manner and term upon which property,
real or personal, within its domain may be transmitted by last will and
testament or by inheritance . . ." U. S. v. Perkins (1896), 163 U. S. 625,
629, 16 S. Ct. 1073, states, ". . . the tax is not a tax upon the property
itself, but upon its transmission by will or descent."
11Kidd v. Alabama (1903), 188 U. S. 730, 23 S. Ct. 401; Cream of Wheat
Co. v. Grand Forks (1920), 253 U. S. 325, 40 S. Ct. 558. It was held that
debts could be taxed at the domicile of the debtor, Blackstone v. Miller (1903),
188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277; at the domicile of the creditor, Fidelity and
Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville (1917), 245 U. S. 54, 38 S. Ct. 40; at a
business situs, New Orleans v. Stemple (1899), 175 U. S. 309, 20 S. Ct. 110;
Bristol v. Washington County (1900), 177 U. S. 133, 20 S. Ct. 585; and
possibly in the case of a specialty debt, at the situs of the specialty, Wheeler
v. Sohmer (1914), 233 U. S. 434, 34 S. Ct. 607. Shares of stock were taxable
at the domicile of the stockholder, Hawley v. Malden (1914), 232 U. S. 1,
34 S. Ct. 201; Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925), 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603; and
at that of the corporation, Cory v. Baltimore (1905), 196 U. S. 466, 25 S. Ct.
297. "Corporate excesses" (the excess of the market value of its outstanding
stock over the value of its real and personal property and certain indebtedness)
were taxable at the domicile of the corporation, Cream of Wheat Co. v.
Grand Forks (1920), 253 U. S. 325, 40 S. Ct. 558; and proportionately at
the place where the corporate business was transacted, Adams Express Co.
v. Ohio (1897), 165 U. S. 194, 17 S. Ct. 305, 166 U. S. 185, 17 S. Ct. 604-;
Adams Express Co. v Kentucky (1897), 166 U. S. 171, 17 S Ct. 527.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
this traditional attitude came in 1929. The court held that Virginia had no
power to tax a trust fund administered in Maryland by a Maryland trustee
for a Virginia cestui.1 2  This was followed by a number of decisions which
seemed to indicate that the court was changing its position from multiple
taxation of intangibles to one of finding a situs for the property at the
domicile of the owner and that the property was taxable there under the
maxim mobilia sequuntur personarn. A state could not impose an inheritance
tax upon bonds issued by the state itself and its municipalities, owned by a
decedent domiciled in a foreign state and kept at his domicile. Only the state
of decedent's domicile could impose a tax on the transfer. 13 A state where
bank deposits and securities were located, could not tax their transfer by
death when the decedent was domiciled in a foreign state. 14 This was
followed by a decision that the transfer of the indebtedness owed by a
corporation to a non-resident decedent was not taxable by the state of
incorporation of the debtor.1 5 These decisions culminated in the famous
case of First National Bank of Boston -v. Maine1 6 in which the court invalidated
a tax by the state of incorporation upon a transfer of stock by a non-resident
decedent, upon the ground that such a transfer could be taxed only by the
state of his domicile. It was thought the death knell had been rung for
multiple taxation and that tangibles and intangibles would be treated alike
for taxation purposes in that they would be taxable in only one jurisdiction.17
The two present cases appear to be an about face by the court as they
allow the taxation of the same intangible by more than one state. The securi-
ties of the two trusts were brought within the state of settlor's domicile solely
by the fact that the trust agreement creating the trusts in Colorado and
Alabama reserved to the settlor either the power of revocation or of disposition
by will. This unexercised power is said to be carried by the settlor into the
state of his domicile and brings in its train the entire corpus of the trust
property. It has been said that the power of disposition is equivalent to
ownership and that its relinquishment at death is an appropriate subject
of taxation. 1 8  The question however, is who shall levy the tax? The
federal estate tax on the relinquishment of this interest is not analogous as
there are no state boundaries to be considered. Cases where the property
12 Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia (1929), 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59.
13 Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930), 280 U. S. 204, 50
S. Ct. 98. This case specifically overrules Blackstone v. Miller (1903), 188
U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277. See note in 43 Harv. L. Rev. 792
14 Baldwin v. Missouri (1930), 281 U. S. 588, 50 S. Ct. 436.
15Beider v. South Carolina Tax Commission (1930), 282 U. S. 1,,51 S.
Ct. 54. "
16 (1932), 284- U. S. 312, 322, 52 S. Ct. 174. The court said, "Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, was one of the latest to approve that case
[Blackstone v. Miller] and give countenance to the general doctrine that
intangible property (unlike tangible property) might be subjected to a death
transfer tax in more than one state; but this and all other instances of such
approval, whether express or tacit, with the overthrow of the foundation
upon which they rested, have ceased to have other than historical interest."
17 Brown, "Multiple Taxation By The States-What Is Left Of It?" (1935),
48 Harvard L. R. 407.
18 Chanler v. Kelsey (1907), 205 U. S. 466, 27 S. Ct. 550; Chase National
Bank v. U .S. (1929), 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126; Porter v. The Commissioner
(1933), 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451.
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is in the same state in which decedent was domiciled are not applicable as
there is no question of extraterritorial application of the state statute. The
conflict arises when property held in trust and the decedent are in different
states. The state of decedent's domicile has no jurisdiction over the property
itself. If A dies in Indiana leaving tangible personalty located in Ohio and
Illinois, clearly Indiana does not have the power to tax the transfer of the
property because it is without the jurisdiction of She state. Yet A, if he had
so desired during his lifetime, did not need to revoke any sort of instrument
to bring that property into the state of his domicile. But, this power, while
unexercised, did not detract from the taxing power of the state where the
property was located, or permit taxation by the domiciliary state. 19 It would
seem therefore that the power of disposition by a resident of a state should
give that state no authority to tax intangible property held in trust in another
jurisdiction.
In the principal cases the securities have been localized in the states where
the trusts were created, Alabama and Colorado. The settlor of the Alabama
trust had no power of revocation since 1917, and the settlor of the Colorado
trust never exercised her right of revocation. The exercise of any right or
power reserved by the settlor was dependent on the laws of the state of the
residence of the trustee and not upon or subject to the laws of the settlor's
domicile. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes says, "The fundamental question is
thus not one of a reserved but unexercised power of revocation or of ultimate
control in an owner, but whether securities, classed as intangibles, are neces-
sarily and in all circumstances subject to a different rule from that obtaining
in the case of tangible property. It is not perceived that there is a sound basis
for such an invariable distinction, which is foreign to common thought and
practical needs." 20 The Supreme Court long ago when considering the
question in regard to tangible property did not hesitate to limit the application
of the fiction mobilia sequunfur personam.2 1 If the court continues the view
of the principal cases, multiple taxation can be avoided only by establishing
the trust in the state of the domicile of the settlor, or as has been suggested
by a recent writer, 2 2 by reciprocity between the states. F. J. N.
TAXATION OF JUDGES' SALARIES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-Justice Woodrough
took office as Judge of the Eighth United States Circuit Court May 1, 1933.
The Federal Revenue Act of 1932 provided for the taxation of incomes
including the compensation of judges of courts of the United States taking
office after June 6, 1932.1 This provision was included in subsequent
Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936.2 Justice Woodrough paid the 1936
tax under protest and then sued to recover the amount on the grounds that
18 Frick v. Pennsylvania (1905), 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603.
20 Graves v. Elliott (1939), 307 U. S. 383, 392, 59 S. Ct. 913, 917.
21 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 26
S. Ct. 36.
22 Lowndes, "The Passing of Situs" (1932), 45 Harvard L. R. 777.
147 Stat. 169, 178, 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 22 (a), Federal Revenue Act of
1932, C. 209.
248 Stat. 680, 686, 687, 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 22 (a), Federal Revenue Act
of 1934, c. 277. 49 Stat. 1648, 1657, 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 22 (a) (Supp. 1936)
Federal Revenue Act of 1936, c. 690.
